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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS

PURPOSING SELF *VERSUS* POTENT SOUL: A DISCUSSION OF PROFESSOR WARREN'S "STUDY OF PURPOSE"

THERE is ever-increasing need to distinguish between vitalism, a philosophical doctrine upheld by a strong minority of modern biologists, and self-psychology, the theory of those who believe that psychology studies not primarily mental processes or functions or modes of behavior, but a functioning, behaving self. The two doctrines are alike in their opposition to a mechanistic conception of psychology; but there the agreement ends. For the heart of vitalism is its metaphysical conception of a soul, or entelechy, which guides the organism in its growth and functioning, whereas self-psychology —which is science, not philosophy—deals with the experienced self to which it attributes neither freedom, nor a peculiar potency, nor guiding force. The belief that one has deprived psychology of the self when one has purged biology of the vitalist's entelechy, or soul, is responsible for the intrusion, from an opposite direction, of philosophy into psychology. An instance of this mechanistic metaphysic, confusing strictly psychological issues, I find in Professor Warren's notable "Study of Purpose."[1]

Dr. Warren analyzes conscious purpose into five main factors: (1) *"forethought,"* which may be concrete or symbolic, complete or syncopated (pp. 10 ff.); (2) *"assent,"* or "consciousness of intention, decision, or volition" which distinguishes purpose from mere imagination of the future (pp. 12 ff.); (3) *"potency feeling,"* which accompanies the assent only "in complex purposes which involve deliberation" (pp. 16 ff.); (4) *"the self-factor,"* usually implicit, shown to be present by the consideration that "the thought of an act is not purposive unless the thinker himself is concerned in accomplishing it" (pp. 21 ff); and (5) *"the sense of fitness and unfitness . . .* frequently associated with the perception of the completed situation" (pp. 22 ff.). It will be noted that the first, second, and fourth factors enumerated in this singularly adequate analysis of purpose—forethought, assent, and the self-factor—are, it is implied, always

[1] This JOURNAL, Vol. XIII., pp. 5 ff., 29 ff., 57 ff.

present, whereas potency-feeling and the sense of fitness are rightly described as occasionally or "frequently," not invariably, present.

In the face of this analysis it is surprising to find that Professor Warren reaches the conclusions that purpose is a mechanical category. The considerations on which he bases this doctrine are, in the main, the following:

1. He first virtually reduces the potency-feeling, assent, and the feeling of self, all three, to kinesthetic, sometimes supplemented by organic, sensations. "The self-factor may be traced," he says, "to kinesthetic elements" (p. 22[2]); "in the potency-feeling," he declares he discovers "no element but the kinesthetic data" (p. 20[3]); "if we analyze the assent-factor," he says, "we find that it consists of kinesthetic and organic data" (p. 13[3]).

It is, however, impossible to accept unquestioningly these conclusions. To begin with: the description of assent and self-feeling as mere sensational complexes tallies oddly with the actual terms in which Warren himself describes these experiences. Thus, he refers to assent as "our attitude" (p. 13[2]) and to the self-factor as the consciousness that "the individual himself is directly concerned in the outcome" (p. 9). But this is the language of self-psychology; and had Professor Warren eschewed these terms and described assent, potency-feeling, and the self-factor solely as complexes of sensation and affection he would certainly have failed to distinguish one from the other and to achieve his peculiarly illuminating and accurate account of purpose. The reduction of volition to sensational and affective elements is, furthermore, diametrically opposed not only to the incidental introspection of such psychologists as Dürr[2] and James,[3] but to the experimentally controlled observations of the subjects of Michotte and Prüm and of Ach. These observers constantly reported the consciousness of the assenting, willing *I*, or self, as an experience "totally different from" mere kinesthetic and organic sensation.[4]

2. Professor Warren's second reason for adopting the mechanical conception of purpose may perhaps be contrasted with the first as a biological, not a specifically psychological, consideration. He believes that two of the factors of purpose, as he has just described it—the anticipation and the adaptation—characterize the merely reflex responses of animal organisms and he concludes that human purpose should be classified as a sub-form of this anticipatory, but purely mechanical, behavior.

[2] *Die Lehre von der Aufmerksamkeit*, 1907, pp. 73 ff.

[3] *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II., p. 569.

[4] *Cf.* Michotte et Prüm, "Étude Expérimentale sur le choix Volontaire," *Archives de Psychologie*, X., 1911, pp. 113 ff., esp. p. 192; N. Ach, *Über den Willensakt und das Temperament*, 1910, esp. pp. 240 ff.

It is important to understand precisely what Warren means by "anticipatory behavior," for this is the pivot of his theory. He describes it as response to a stimulus not yet present, involving "inversion" of the usual temporal order (pp. 30 ff.); and illustrates it by the reactions of a baby to the breast, of a chicken to a grain of corn, and of a raccoon to a maze. "When," he says, "a raccoon is placed in a familiar maze and starts to traverse it, his locomotor adjustments are in part a reaction to the subsequent taste stimuli of the food lying at the far end. . . . When a chicken pecks at a grain of corn it is starting the food-assimilating reaction before the food is touched. In the human infant the sucking act involves a chain of reflexes . . . not fully understood till we study the feeding behavior as a whole. . . . All these forms of behavior are anticipatory; they are reactions . . . before the stimulus is wholly present" (p. 33). An obvious infelicity in this theory is the fact that it is obliged to ignore, or to treat as "incidental accompaniments" (p. 71[2]), three of the five factors—assent, potency-feeling and the self-factor—which Warren, by his initial study, had attributed to the purposive consciousness. And, by Warren's own admission, it must conceive a fourth factor, adaptation, as at once a characteristic of the purposive activity of organisms (pp. 41 ff., 71 ff.) and yet as "*a judgment made by the scientist* and not a quality inherent in creatures and activities" (pp. 45[1], 62, 71 end). But the decisive objection to the theory is the fact that the mechanical animal reflexes which it conceives as anticipatory of reactions to future stimuli and, for this reason, inversions of the usual temporal order never are anticipatory except as supplemented by consciousness,—that of the actor or of the observer. Professor Warren's comparison of these reactions-to-future-stimuli to the "reflex mechanisms of distant receptors," to light and to olfactory stimuli is at best only an analogy; for, as mere mechanism, no organism can be conceived as reacting to future, that is, to as yet non-existing stimuli, so, when Warren says that the reactions of raccoon, chicken, and baby "have reference to," "find meaning in," future stimuli—his statements, though unquestionably correct, are no longer applicable to unconsciously reacting organisms. For only a self, never a mechanism, can "find meaning" or "anticipate." And the temporal order of reaction and food-getting is reversed not in any physical way, but only in somebody's consciousness. Thus, anticipatoriness no less than adaptation is shown to be a psychical, not a mechanical, category; and the conception of human purpose as a form of mechanical behavior is herewith discredited.

But though Professor Warren is, in the opinion of the present writer, unsuccessful and even inconsistent in his doctrine of anticipatory behavior, he abundantly makes good his case against vitalism.

He rightly insists that the unprejudiced introspecter finds no trace, in the experience of purpose, of a "directing entelechy" (p. 36[2]) or of a "dynamic initiator" (p. 48). Against every effort of vitalistic metaphysics to ground itself on psychological observation he spiritedly and rightly protests. In particular, he insists (p. 20[3]) that the "feeling of potency" does not assure the achievement of a purpose and does not argue for freedom of will. To be sure, he seems curiously unaware that a mechanistic as well as a vitalistic metaphysic is out of place in psychology; but he is still amply justified in his protest against "the extension of such notions as indeterminism and compulsion to the sphere of biological processes." We are concerned, however, at the end as at the beginning, to point out that this banishment of the vitalist's soul, or entelechy, leaves intact the experiencing self which Professor Warren's own analysis of purpose has so clearly disclosed.

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SOCIETIES

THE SIXTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION[1]

THE sixteenth annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association was held in New York City, Wednesday and Thursday, December 27 and 28, in acceptance of the invitation of Columbia University. This act of courtesy on the part of Columbia University was appreciated by the members of the association, especially because the holding of the meeting in New York City afforded a welcome opportunity to its members to attend some of the sessions of the American Psychological Association and of the various other learned societies assembled in the city during Christmas week. The interest in the celebration of the Psychological Association was particularly keen. However, these opportunities had the effect of decreasing in some measure the attendance upon the sessions of the Philosophical Association and led to the curtailment of the meeting. The meager audience assembled when the first session was called to order by Presi-

[1] The writer of this report wishes to acknowledge his obligations to Mr. Herbert Schneider, fellow in philosophy in Columbia University, for the assistance in the preparation of this report afforded by his notes on the meeting. These notes were taken at the writer's request. Without Mr. Schneider's help, even so fragmentary an account as this could hardly have been given; for the speed at which some of the papers were read, made the taking of notes difficult, and the lack of abstracts in the case of other papers rendered necessary the taking of rather full notes.

dent Lovejoy was somewhat discouraging; happily, the audience was considerably augmented during the morning, and attendance upon subsequent sessions was fairly large. The executive committee had left to the will of the association the decision as to whether there should be a session on Thursday afternoon, or on Friday morning, or at neither time. The assembly voted to dispense with meetings after that of Thursday morning. This unfortunately deprived the association of all opportunity to hear the papers offered by Mr. Norbert Wiener ("A Criticism of Kant's Transcendental Esthetics") and Mr. Warbeke ("Mr. Schiller and Gorgias").

The executive committee deserves the gratitude of the association for the extreme care displayed in its preparation of the preliminary announcement of the topic for discussion, and in the effort expended in seeking an explicit definition and formulation of the problems involved. The committee's formulation of the topic is as follows: "(*A*) Is the division of the entities present or involved in experience into two reciprocally exclusive classes of 'mental' (or 'psychical') and 'physical' to be retained? (*B*) If so, how is the distinction to be formulated? In particular, what is the essential differentia of the class 'mental' or 'psychical'? Are the entities denoted by its attributes, 'aspects' or relations of things which at the same time may possess the predicate 'physical'; or are they a class of existing things which can never possess the attribute 'physical'? What, specifically, are the entities denoted by the term 'mental'? And how, if at all, is their existence to be established?"[2]

Concerning the timeliness of the committee's selection of the subject for discussion there can hardly be any question. The purposes of the committee were threefold. As stated in its announcement, "the matter of chief moment in the discussion . . . is, of course, not what entities (real or imaginary) can most suitably be called 'mental' or 'psychical,' but whether certain asserted entities, which (suitably or otherwise) *have* been so called, exist and are to be recognized by metaphysics and by psychology."[3] Secondly, as a subsidiary purpose, "to do something to decrease the prevalent diversity and confusion in the use of the terms 'mental' and 'physical.' "[4] And, finally, to make some progress towards the attainment of an acceptable definition of the terms "mental" and "psychical."[5] It will be granted that even a partial fulfilment of any of these purposes would serve as abundant justification for the labors of the committee and

[2] This JOURNAL, Vol. XIII., p. 573. For the committee's notes on the questions quoted, its enumeration of certain current views relating to the questions, and for its annotations concerning subsidiary questions, bibliography, *etc.*, see the preliminary announcement in the issue of this JOURNAL just referred to.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 577.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 576.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 578.

of the leaders of the discussion, and would prove that the assemblage of the association had borne fruit. Whether, and to what degree, such desirable results obtained, it is impossible to estimate. The quick interest manifested by the participants makes evident the stimulating influence of the meeting, and the fruits of this incentive will doubtless be appreciable in the progress of reflection upon a topic so widely recognized as of momentous and present concern.

The committee is certainly not at fault if its labors were not crowned with that convergence of the discussion upon the same issues and that focusing of interest and inquiry upon the same or closely related topics for which it planned. The committee had expected that abstracts of the papers to be presented by the leaders of the discussion would be circulated among those leaders, so that some measure of inter-adjustment and articulation of the positions maintained might be secured before the presentation of the papers. Owing to insufficiency of time, this plan miscarried. The papers of the leaders of discussion were also to be published before the meeting, but this too was not carried out. The results were that the positions expounded by the leaders started from different bases, were addressed to different issues, and the underlying similarity of interest and the nuclei of agreement and precise points of disagreement were obscured. Besides, the committee was unable to determine the logical order in which the papers should be read—a matter of comparative unimportance, however, after the failure of its other plans. Such being the situation, it became the task of the meeting to disclose whatever unanimity of purpose and identity of idea existed, and to secure the focalization of the lines of thought, instead of taking its departure from whatever common fund of agreement concerning issues, methods of approach, and delimitations of subject that might have been attained beforehand by a favorable outcome of the committee's designs. It may be said, therefore, with some truth, that the meeting closed at the point at which the discussion might conceivably have opened. The breadth of the topic was recognized beforehand, and to some extent the situation that arose was anticipated. Yet something would undoubtedly have been gained in the way of clarified issues had the scheme adopted been carried out. The experience of this meeting, therefore, should indicate that an earlier announcement of the topic of discussion, coupled with the circulation of abstracts prior to the meeting, would render more effective the meetings of the association.

The first paper presented to the assembly was that of Professor I. W. Riley, entitled "French Philosophy in America." Following Comte, Professor Riley divided the course of this influence into three stages. First, the theological stage, which might be characterized as

the stage of puritanism. At this point the French influences led to a negative reaction, for French deism and naturalism were an abomination to the puritan temper. These impulses, however, had a destructive effect, and in this the power of Voltaire was prominent. Second, the metaphysical stage, in which naturalism, as represented by Voltaire, and eclecticism, as represented by Cousin, were effective. The third stage is the positivistic, marked by the influence of Comte. Naturalism was opposed to the traditional and dogmatic elements, and the reaction against these, largely incited by naturalism, led to transcendentalism. The foreign stimuli toward transcendentalism did not come directly from Germany, but indirectly, through England, and more particularly through Coleridge. Eclecticism was attractive to the transcendentalists partly because of their opposition to systematization in philosophy, and French eclecticism was approved in so far as it was vague rather than in so far as it was precise. The clarity of style of eclectic writings, and the confidence expressed by eclecticism in the impulses of instinct, were appreciated. Professors Henry and Ripley translated and expounded Cousin, and Henry, in particular, defended Cousin against the charge of misinterpreting Locke. The Boston Unitarians and the Princeton Presbyterians alike levelled their attacks upon electicism as the latest form of infidelity. In response to Professor Lovejoy's question as to the relative influence of the *Dictionary* and the *Encyclopedia* upon American thought, Professor Riley stated that the former was the popular work, the other being alluded to rather scantily. Professor Riley went on to call to notice the part played by Jefferson as mediator in the transmission of Gallic thought. De Tracy's *Elements of Political Economy* was translated at his suggestion and Jefferson himself contributed the preface to the translation.

In the absence of Professor Norman Wilde, the president called upon Professor Woodbridge to read his paper on "Structure." Professor Woodbridge stated the question: What is meant by the structure of things? and asserted that one's philosophical preferences were irrelevant to the study of the question. The problem is to discover a structural principle to which every solution of the problems involved must conform. Illustrations from a number of fields were cited. In mathematics, the structural principle is determined by limits, by *maxima*, and *minima*. In mechanics, which deals with the limiting principles of the structure of bodies, we find that the whole of the science is the setting forth of those limiting principles to which all cases of displacement and equilibrium must conform. Whatever bodies may be called—congeries of sensations, or whatever one's philosophical predilections demand—we find always structure and structural principles. Chemistry is a kind of mechanics, expound-

ing the displacement of bodies in terms of the combination of elements, although a time element is essential in chemistry in a way not found in mechanics, for in the former time seems to be a real factor in structure. This suggests that structural conceptions are not always a matter of space alone. In biology this point is still more evident, for while biological structure involves that of mechanics and chemistry, there is superadded the structure of growth; and of growth, duration is characteristic. Life-histories are genuine temporal structures. The distinction between the vital and the mental, the speaker suggested, may be established in terms of structure. The structure of thought differentiates the living and the mental, while it is the business of logical science to express the limits of structure; this expression requires formulæ peculiar to this science. The syllogism may be instanced as an example of logical structure.

What are the implications of this consideration of structure? First, structure is a genuine discovery—it is not an hypothesis, a mere aid to thinking, nor does it have a sure status as a preliminary to thinking or discovery. Historically, and for the individual, it seems more natural to take things as structureless, chaotic, irregular. Structure, historically, is the discovery of order in the flux. Secondly, the discovery of structure is a final satisfaction to inquiry—for to understand the structure of the world would mean its satisfactory explanation. With complete knowledge of structure, science would come to an end. Thirdly, the consummation of the task of science would not mean the cessation of effort and consequent stagnation; for while knowledge would become dogmatic, art would become free, and invention the business of life. Fourthly, no dualism or inflexible distinction between the world and its structure is to be tolerated. The world does not *have* structure, it *is* structure. This leads to the fifth point, for if substance and structure be taken as identical, the question is pertinent: What are the attributes of structure? The primary attribute is inertia. It is a limiting principle of operations; it is not a force, but that which is illustrated and revealed in the "going-on" of things. Structure and matter are one and the same. It is difficult to think of matter in terms of its concrete kinds: if elements are transmutable, none is primary, yet all obey the principles of structure.

Professor Woodbridge's paper elicited a rather unusual degree of sympathy and assent, and it held the mind of the meeting as shown by references to it in subsequent discussion. Professor Spaulding raised several questions: In terms of what is structure expressed? What are the ultimate terms of structure? Isn't the structural point of view the same thing as the relational point of view? What is the relation between structures? May we not study the structure of the

discovery situation? To these queries, Professor Montague added three: What is the likeness or difference of meaning between structure, invariant, law, and function? Is structure an aspect of law? Or is law a species of structure? Professor Urban wanted to know whether, after the discovery of structure is complete, the remaining field is not that of appreciation. Professor Brown asked whether structure were the static or the changeless, and further inquired concerning the relation of structure to the absolute, asking whether the structure of structures is the absolute. Professor Overstreet desired to know the place the world of creation and appreciation is to have in structure. Professor Riley wanted to know how the inertia of structures is to be explained in a merely negative way. Finally, Professor Lovejoy asked about the antithesis of structure, in particular inquiring whether agency, form, activity, or the constructed could be taken as the opposite.

To this flood of questions Professor Woodbridge replied briefly. The thesis concerning structure was not thought of in terms of a negative antithesis. The fact of structure is so aggressive, however, that it seems there must be something to be given structure. In so far as he had any negative, said Professor Woodbridge, it is agency or activity as proposed by Professor Lovejoy. The fact of structure itself needs no explanation. As for the terms in which structure is to be expressed, the answer is, only in terms of structure, that is, in terms of the concrete structural problem. The problem of the relation of structures is a concrete structural problem. The relation of structure to unvarying law is extremely close, for the laws of nature are structural formulæ. Inertia expresses the fact that structure can not be changed, though one can be substituted for another. As for the relation of structure to the absolute, Professor Woodbridge averred that structure is what the philosophers ought to mean by the absolute, although such an absolute stripped of its emotional qualities. The consideration of structure leads to the absolute in the only sense in which such a conception is legitimate—as that without which things can neither be nor be conceived. The world of appreciation is not grounded in the nature of things, but is a way of transforming the world—the world of art is a definite kind of performance, but has no place in structure. It is not explanatory, but is the gift of the free imagination.

Professor Boodin followed Professor Woodbridge with a paper on "Social Systems." Three questions represented the direction of inquiry in the paper: Are there social facts? Do these conform to the postulates implied in systems? Do they fit in with the closed systems of the past? And also what is the promise in the way of generalizations in social systems? The speaker noted two false traditions

in connection with his inquiry—physiological materialism, which leads to solipsism, and juristic formalism, which is the result of extreme intellectualism. Social facts are relations of a unique kind. The social whole and social facts are different qualitatively from individuals and the material components of society. The factors in a social situation are the presence of more than one mind and the existence of a social tradition. Social facts present three salient characteristics: variableness, recurrence, and form. The primary variables are human individuals, capacities, and habits. The secondary are the type of group life, epoch, folk-ways, and the like. Social facts possess persistent traits that render prediction possible. By form is signified that attribute of facts which makes them statable in definite laws. Social laws are not laws of physical equilibrium. A number of empirical laws can be stated, though not with exactitude. Among such generalizations are the law of relativity of values, the law of least action (the tendency to economy in social behavior), the law of rhythm or of periodicities in social life, and the laws of accumulation or conservation. The existence of these laws, even in inexact form, gives assurance that a science of social systems is possible.

In criticism of this paper, Professor Cox insisted that social laws should be relinquished to their own fields, and that social facts should not be investigated in terms of philosophical or mathematical categories. Furthermore, a distinction between social science and social reforms must be adhered to, and social science should not be undertaken with the intention of edification. Professor Pratt urged the point that the laws of society are either merely laws borrowed from other sciences, or else the laws of society are not laws at all. The borrowing of the laws from other fields engenders the following dilemma: either the laws are exact and untrue, or else they are true and inexact. The query is pertinent: can the laws of society be stated in a form exact enough to be of any use? Professor Brown wished to know whether recurrence represents a principle of equal rank with principle of variability and form, or whether it is subordinate to, and a consequence of, the latter.

In reply Professor Boodin stated that following Whitehead he took recurrence to mean that the phenomenon could occur over and over. The three characteristics he had emphasized would apply to all systems—we must have variables, they must recur, and they must be organized. Furthermore, the laws of society, such as Tarde's laws of imitation, are not more abstract than Newton's laws.

Following this discussion, the president found time for the reading of Professor Crooks's paper: "Does the Absolute Idealism of Royce Constitute a Theology?" Royce's doctrine of the deity is a definitely and systematically worked out doctrine of God such as is

essential to a theology. The rationalistic Royce considers the concept of God, and here the argument is the Anselmic ontological argument. The principle of proof is that the possibility of error implies reality. Royce later advances to the statement that God is a person. In the *World and the Individual* a form of monistic idealism is presented that seeks to guarantee the individuality both of the absolute and of man. The *Supplementary Essay* attempts to prove first, that the absolute is the person of all persons, and secondly, that the absolute is just such a person as to admit within its infinitude other infinite series, *e. g.*, human purposes, or personalities, made complete. In order to attain eternal life, a pious attitude toward the one must be assumed, and the one gathers up within itself the fragmentary purposes of the many and gives them fulfilment. In winning infinitude, the individual wins complete individuality. All reality is completed personality, and hence the doctrine tends toward pantheism. But with the assertion that the absolute is a person, we find a new type of pantheism. The solution to the problem of evil is found in the negative, finite, fragmentary character of evil. The pillars of any true religion according to Royce are the ancient doctrines of incarnation and vicarious sacrifice. The nucleus of Royce's doctrine of vicarious atonement lies in the thought that only by suffering when we are not guilty are we able to comprehend evil and to glimpse the whole. The approach to these doctrines is rationalistic, but it is also voluntaristic, and finds a place even for emotion. Religion is social, and the "beloved community" is the form in which the absolute expresses himself. Royce's doctrine is fitted to serve as the basis of a systematic theology.

After the reading of this paper the meeting adjourned. The afternoon session was devoted to the presentation of papers on the topic of discussion and to general discussion. The president explained beforehand the failure of the committee's plans, which was referred to above.

Professor Cohen was requested to present the first contribution. A lengthy syllabus prepared by Professor Cohen was distributed. In this syllabus were outlined the idealistic, materialistic, and dualistic positions on the subject. Professor Cohen began his remarks by pointing out that nobody thinks of the mental and physical as identical. The question is how they are to be distinguished. There is no presumption in favor of mutual exclusiveness. The "idealistic" position that all is mental is to be rejected on the grounds that it involves an infinite regress and that it "supplies no differentiation for 'inner' or mental life." Materialism with its assertion that all is physical, the mental being a part thereof, gives occasion for the same logical objection. For if everything is matter, matter becomes a negative

class; and the "science of physics is impossible if we can not exclude certain entities as not genuine physical terms, *e. g.*, beliefs."

The arguments for the dualistic position that the mental and the physical are mutually exclusive were considered in some detail. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is not fundamental, and furthermore, now that modern science has found that qualities obey mathematical laws, the motive for the subjectivation of secondary qualities is gone. The prime difficulty with exclusive dualism resides in the conclusion which follows, namely, that if my ideas copy things, then I must know the things themselves of which I have copies, and there is a duplication of the object known. The cleavage between the originals and the copies can not be retained.

Professor Cohén then outlined the position of neutral monism. The mental and the physical are "overlapping selections of neutral qualities such as logical relations"; each series is "defined by its fundamental postulates." Neutral monism was distinguished from phenomenalism and sensationalism; the objects known by physics may have no sense-qualities, but may lead to sense-qualities, or turn out to be sense-qualities. "Hypothetical entities (atoms, electrons, . . .) as objects of scientific judgment are as much entitled to physical existence as sense-qualities." To the question: when and where do these neutrals exist if not in mind or in physical body? the following answer is given in the syllabus: "A thing exists if it occupies a position in a given series. Neutral logical entities exist as parts of the mental and physical series, but also exist in the sense in which roots of equations exist, or in the sense in which the total universe of mind and body exists."

Professor Montague remarked that Professor Cohen had been unfair to the epistemological dualist in the following statement (from the syllabus): "The difference between the time of perception and the time of the existence of the object can be and is known. Hence, self-refuting character of the assumption that the object can be known only as existing at the time of perception." The critic insisted that the real point is the independent variation of the object perceived and objects known thereby. The perceived series of objects vary with the organism's condition, while the inferred object differs therefrom—hence the epistemological dualist claims a numerical difference. Professor Cohen responded to this criticism by denying that they are independent variables.

The assembly then heard Professor Bode's paper on the "Meaning of the Psychical." Professor Bode asserted that the problem is one of differentiating between conscious and unconscious behavior. We have two alternatives: First, we may point out the features that characterize conscious behavior by assigning to this behavior a quality

that makes it differ from other behavior; or secondly, we may appeal to the specific objects or situations that call it forth. Adopting the behavioristic standpoint, we may say that the organization of complex modes of response characterizes conscious behavior. It involves action controlled by an end, flexibility of organization, and the representation in the present of the possible consequences of acts. All consciousness is dependent on conflicting impulses. The object controls behavior by bodying forth results of activities which are still in abeyance. By conscious control is meant a search for new stimulations or a transformation of the present situation. There arises, therefore, a contrast between the certain and the uncertain, and this is the root of the distinction between the mental and the physical.

Professor Henderson criticized this position by declaring that he could not understand how consciousness could be defined in terms of behavior—as a form of behavior. Pragmatically, consciousness appears as activity furthering adaptation. But consciousness is something more than behavior; it is worth something in itself, it has independent value and ends apart from the adaptation of the organism.

Professor Hoernlé, whose paper was next called for, explained that the point of view from which his paper was written is conveyed by the title: "Confessions of an Old Idealist." He deprecated the effort to devise a generally acceptable terminology—the hope for such agreement is vain, and it is not desirable. Diversity of vision is the essence of philosophy, and there is no place for unanimity in philosophy. To the question: is the division of entities into two mutually exclusive groups desirable? must be appended this further question: in what context? The distinction is not helpful to science, but is important for philosophy. We should define the various points of view which yield the diverse meanings of the terms. What is the distinctively philosophical context from which the distinction should be drawn? The answer is metaphysics (including epistemology). Metaphysics must leave a free hand for science: but with similar restraint, the scientist must permit the metaphysician to handle scientific concepts as he pleases. The Cartesian dualism is inadmissible in the context of the natural sciences; nor can we admit in the context of metaphysics any distinction which depends on the science of energetics. We need a theory which will present the context in which the contrast of the mental and the physical is to be recognized as relevant and just. Professor Hoernlé went on to state briefly the position of Alexander (who rejects the dualistic structure), and of Russell (to whom the physical thing and the physical world are logical constructions), concluding that the mental and the physical may fall apart, but any element of the one may occur in the other.

Professor Warner Fite followed Professor Hoernlé. He stated

that he wished to proceed from the standpoint of the agent, the problem being to answer the question: how may consciousness be established? Where is consciousness? Not in anything specifically mental, for there are no peculiarly mental entities, and there is no series of inner experiences distinct from the series of outer experiences. All consciousness is in varying degrees consciousness of an object. The question: where is consciousness? should be supplanted by this: where is it *not*? The consciousness of an object will be found in the meaning of an object, and for the agent the meaning of the object is not separable from the object. Only for the observer does meaning leave the object unaltered. Meaning is personal, and objects can not be wholly depersonalized. Every object has a history. The peculiarity of the conscious side of things is expressed by familiarity and intelligibility. Contrariwise, every object has a strangeness and opacity, and these mark the limits of consciousness. So far, accordingly, as the world is familiar and intelligible, there we find consciousness. Consciousness is in the things that we know, really in the world. It is not a casual relation between entities. Where is consciousness? Where is it *not*?

At this point the meeting was adjourned. Before closing, President Lovejoy expressed the hope that the discussion of the following morning would militate towards a clearer definition of the issues and an explication of the relations between the various standpoints that had been expounded.

In accordance with the wish of the president, at the opening of the session of Thursday morning, Professor Pratt sought to coordinate the different strands of thought by giving a brief review of the positions of Professors Cohen, Bode, and Hoernlé. Thereupon the speaker, whose paper bore the title "Confessions of an Old Realist," proceeded to defend the dualistic view. Consciousness and the world of objects in space are entirely different in kind. There is a real space and consciousness is not in it. The dualist has no *a priori* doctrine about consciousness or nature. The dualism of consciousness and the external world is the simplest and most natural explanation. To make the subjective and objective continuous, as does Hollingworth, does not touch the distinction between the physical and the psychical, but only a distinction within the psychical.

Following this speaker, Mrs. Grace A. de Laguna read a paper on "The Limits of the Physical." We must distinguish between epistemological dualism and ontological dualism; they do not imply each other. The object of knowledge is not to be identified with the physical. The classic formulations of dualism were due to the discovery of physical uniformities, and the concept of the mental is a precipitate out of the practise of viewing physical uniformities as

universal. We all tacitly believe that there are limits to explanation by physical science. The limit of the physical is not the psychical, but the irrelevance of physical data, of physical uniformities. The apparent antinomy that arises, namely, that it is impossible to admit that the mechanical description is complete, while it is at the same time seemingly impossible not to admit it, is negligible when we consider that because a given event is describable in physical terms, it does not follow that the class of such events can be so described. Physical science can exhaust by analysis a given event only in so far as it can be construed as a particular case of a universal principle; but the concrete particular event is not completely described when taken as such a case. The limits of physical description are set by the intelligibility of the application of physical principles. The problem of the relation of the physical and the psychical is not an ontological problem. The genuine question is: Is the behavior of a living organism, especially one with a nervous system, describable in terms of physical science?

Professor Urban then spoke on the subject "Meaning in Modern Psychology and the Problem of the Existence of the Psychical." Meanings may be divided into three classes: (1) objective, which are as objective as objects and propositions, and are subsistent rather than existent, although non-mental; (2) quasi-subjective; and (3) subjective. The latter kinds do not exist independently of the organism and imply the psychical. In the sense in which existence is defined by the committee,[6] quasi-subjective and subjective meanings are existents. Subjective meanings are characterized by being directed on something—and this defines the psychical. The psychical entity is one, the assumption of the existence of which is necessitated by the relation "meaning-of," when the substitution of either physical or neutral entities renders the context unintelligible. "An Unlisted Definition of the Psychical" was the title of Professor Durant Drake's paper. Professor Drake explained his position as realistic epistemological dualist, and as an ontological monist. Sense-qualities are of just the same nature as the rest of reality; they are not identical with causal agencies, but there is a one-one relation between them. Sense-qualities are effects produced in us, and are not in objects. To the objection that this renders knowledge of the external world impossible, the reply is that the one-one correspondence gives us a formal knowledge of the external world, though not of its quality. Consciousness is a set of qualia, each existing in its own point of time, but bound together through the influence of a nervous system. The outer world is potentially consciousness, and the mental means this organization of qualia in a space-time order.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 574, note 3.

Professor Hartman presented a paper entitled "A Definition of Dualistic Entities." Various uses of the term "consciousness" were examined by the reader; the equation of the term with energy, or a type of situation, or hesitancy and discrepancy, or to relation, was felt to be inadequate. Consciousness, if it is a type of relation, is a type so unique as to be unresolvable into the physical. Ultimate existence is heterogeneous, pluralistic. Whenever we apply the term "thing," we refer to heterogeneity, independence, and unity. An entity is, therefore, defined more ultimately by causation than by quality.

As the programme of papers was now completed, the topic was thrown open to general discussion. President Lovejoy urged that the meeting address itself to the task of securing a logical correlation of the points made in the papers.

Miss Calkins agreed that meaning defines a class of objects neither physical nor psychical, but deplored the vagueness of the term as used by Professor Urban. The term is used in a mischievously large sense. Further, in speaking of the psychical, the terms "color," "sound," and the like ought not be used, but "seeing," "hearing," and similar forms. The essence of meaning is personal relation, to be defined in terms of the self.

Professor Boodin, rejecting dualism, took the position that mental processes are a type of activity-system, but it is only one type of many, and is not to be opposed to the physical. Another speaker suggested that a definition of the physical might be derived by identifying the physical with the mechanical, that is, with the portion of phenomena suffering from a dissipation of energy.

Professor Montague regretted the commingling of epistemological questions with those concerning the difference of the psychical and the physical. The difference would come up as a problem for any epistemological position. The problem consists in discovering how the experience of the past and anticipatory experience of the future, which seem to differentiate the psychical, can be fitted into a physical series. Professor Overstreet endorsed Professor Woodbridge's endeavor to free our thinking from the shackles of old connotations. The conflict of opinion comes largely from the attempt to crowd the world into the restrictions imposed by such atavisms. If we approach the world as a pluralism of structures we have a more fruitful method of approach.

There followed the concluding remarks of the leaders of the discussion. Professor Cohen explained that his attack was on the reciprocally exclusive character of the physical and the psychical. The physical is for him the object of physical science, the psychical the object of psychology. The existence of knowledge is an insuperable objection to mutual exclusiveness. Physics deals with a certain selec-

tion of materials and is a method of handling it. The method is not universally useful. All facts having a mathematical structure constitute an objection to such a dualism. With reference to Professor Pratt's position, he denied that absolute dualism is either simple or natural.

Professor Hoernlé found himself largely in agreement with Professors Cohen and Overstreet. Professor Pratt could not find that Mrs. de Laguna had left any room for purpose and meaning. If the physical is not limited by the psychical, have the sciences which deal with the psychical any genuine subject-matter? Professor Pratt seemed to maintain a more flexible distinction at this point than his paper had indicated, for he admitted the possibility of a third kind of entity, and asserted that dualism is not a final description of the universe, but represents one of the most important distinctions that can be made.

At this point the presiding officer requested Professor Creighton to speak. Professor Creighton in a few happy words expressed his belief that the outcome of the discussion emphasized the need of cooperation in philosophic pursuits. What we need, he averred, is not common definitions: the division and subdivisions in the formulation of questions are rather a limitation than a help. Philosophy is a criticism of categories, of points of view and the relations of points of view. "Entities," "existents," and the like appealed to him as "little absolutes"; and the critics of absolutism seem always to fall back upon such lesser absolutes. These lesser absolutes, however, are but categories by means of which we interpret experience, and sooner or later must lose their acclaimed position as absolute entities in the chastening process of criticism.

The presidential address, "On the Conditions of Progress in Philosophical Inquiry," was delivered at the dinner of the association, which was held at the Hotel Brevoort, on Wednesday evening. After paying a fitting tribute to Josiah Royce, President Lovejoy discussed certain of the ailments of philosophical inquiry and suggested remedies for these distempers. He described first of all the phenomenon of "speculative fashions." Philosophical speculation seems not to result in a "settling of questions," but in recurrent revivals of old ideas and in a rhythm of fashionable opinions rather than in progress in knowledge. There are some thinkers who would even accept these divergences of opinion as final, and reduce philosophizing to a "sporting interest," using as an apology the differences among scientists. This, thought the president, is poor solace, for theoretical controversy is only satisfying when used for persuasion and not merely for sport, and argument is designed to lead to the establishment of scientific truths. This attaining of scientific truths

by philosophers is impeded by the fact that the philosopher is, as a rule, only half inquirer and half edifier. But the edification function of the philosopher is waning, and more trust is being placed in the cogency of truth itself. This cogency is, however, difficult to measure statistically, and actuarial methods of measuring the probable error in philosophies is elusive.

Hence it is necessary to inquire into the generic causes of error in philosophizing. Of these Professor Lovejoy discussed four: (1) Error is caused by the lack of the inductive observer's habit of mind. Too much philosophizing starts with an "inspiration and illumination" process, instead of from an observation of the conditions which are pertinent to the problem. There is need of an observational technique if we wish to get anything more than a "mob of private convictions." (2) Error results from the failure to make an exhaustive enumeration of pertinent instances; (3) next, from the lack of cooperative inquiry and the complementary and correcting action of other minds; (4) also, from the failure to isolate the problem successfully. Too many philosophical problems are discussed only by bringing in a whole philosophical system; and to prevent this the development of hypothetical reasoning and a method of isolation are essential. A catalogue *raisonné* of considerations, a philosophical map, is much needed, if philosophical inquiry is to make conscious progress.

After the presidential address, Mr. Woodbridge paid a tribute to Professor Creighton in his capacity as editor of the *Philosophical Review,* which is celebrating its twenty-fifth anniversary. He called attention to the great rôle which this periodical has played in crystallizing philosophical discussion and in promoting philosophical inquiry in America.

At the business meeting of the association on Thursday morning, Professor A. W. Moore was elected president of the association, and Professors Schmidt and Wilde were placed on the committee, taking the places vacated by Professor Cohen and Urban.

The observation has already been made that the meeting of the association did not attain such a degree of successful organization and articulation of the themes of discussion as would have precipitated out of the confusion of opinions some points of general acceptation or clear-cut issues. The cursory sketch of the proceedings that has been given will indicate this. Perhaps one might resignedly opine that all efforts toward such results were foredoomed to failure because of the breadth of the topic and the inevitable outcropping of so many diversities in philosophic faiths. While comfort might be derived from the thought of Professor Hoernlé, the address of the president is apt to chill one's complacent reliance upon this source of reassurance. However this may be, it is but natural to hope that the

future plans of the committee may be crowned with success, and that the circulation of abstracts, the publication of papers prior to the meeting, and similar expedients may be resorted to. It is hardly doubtful that the value of the annual conference will be thereby enhanced. There is one precaution, at least, that may easily be taken; namely, that all who present papers endeavor so to limit their length that they can be read within the time assigned at a comfortable pace—comfortable for both reader and auditor. Some of the misapprehensions and failures to perceive the course of the argument which continually occur are the results of reeling off a twenty-five or thirty-minute paper at a twenty-minute speed. Furthermore, it occasionally happens that the reader is compelled to omit sections of his paper because of the time-limits, or time is called before the paper is finished; this frequently produces such apparent discontinuities that the sequence of ideas escapes comprehension.

The temper of the meeting indicated in a stimulating way that the dualism of the physical and the psychical, or other supposedly clear and ready-to-hand distinctions between two kinds of entities, are no longer to be taken as given, or obvious, or natural. The ancient division of entities into two mutually exclusive classes has subtly influenced philosophical and psychological theory in many ways, most of them being unwarranted in fact or theory. It was evident that there is a general awakening to the situation, and that this is accompanied by a determination to clarify it by bringing to the surface the problems actually involved. This division of entities has sometimes been almost an unquestioned dogma, and has governed the course of inquiry in hieratic fashion. Or as an unattended, widely diffused tradition it has subtly impregnated the very terms of discourse, so that it is difficult to use certain terms without connoting the dualistic position and virtually admitting it. It has affected in devious ways the philosopher's vision of his subject-matter and operated so as to prejudice really unrelated issues; the division of entities has been influential especially where no cognizance was taken of it. There seemed to be a fairly unanimous opinion in the assemblage that the division has actually been rooted in the general philosophical tradition rather than generated through an examination of experience. Indeed, that it had often guided the study of experience rather than resulted from it. The attitude of those in attendance, in so far as there was a common attitude, seemed to be that debate concerning the nature of the "mental" and its relation to the "physical" was bootless until the grounds in justification of the cleavage between the kinds of data of experience could be revealed. The majority seemed to agree with Professor Cohen that the dualistic position was neither obvious nor natural. The mutual exclusiveness

of the groups of entities was neither unequivocally demanded by the facts of experience nor uncompromisingly required by psychology. And finally, even if the twofold division were the most available and suggestive, the distinction was not a sharp one, nor necessarily of prime importance for all philosophical interests. In short, there was implied a rather general endorsement of the executive committee's opinion that the "matter of chief moment in the discussion . . . is . . . not what entities (real or imaginary) can most suitably be called 'mental' or 'psychical,' but whether certain asserted entities, which (suitably or otherwise) *have* been so called, exist and are to be recognized by metaphysics and by psychology." The chief interest, that is to say, was not in locating the various entities in one or the other of the two groups. The existence of the entities is called in question and a justification for their classification demanded.

One's immediate impressions of the meeting, however, are apt to undergo a revision in later reflection. The auditor was likely to experience the stimulus of apprehending points of view characterized by novelty, a healthy independence of tradition, and a happy recognition and utilization of the services of science; there seemed to exist a vivid interest in the discovery of problems rather than in the stubborn defense of positions, and the listener was made to expect the germination of ideas bearing some promise of that progress in inquiry signalized in the presidential address. With respect to the problems under discussion and related issues, a survey of the philosophical literature of recent years inculcates the belief that philosophical opinion has traveled far in that time. Even the casual reader notices the nonchalant and somewhat boisterous manner in which liberties are taken with older notions of consciousness and its content, and the irreverential handling of the "psychical." Some, at least, of the philosophic fashions seem to be in danger of becoming old-fashioned. These impressions the meeting of the association certainly did not dispel. Such observations lead one to be sanguine. But coupled with this was the generally depressing effect of disagreement and variance of opinion, scarcely mitigated by isolated instances of community of belief.

The revision of one's impressions in later reflection rather reverses the sources of comfort and discomfort. For at a distance, the agreement which Professor Creighton found emerges from the chaos of first impressions. One perceives that, after all, the platforms expressed at the meeting are not easily grouped into types and schools. The comparative absence of fixed lines of demarcation between philosophic "denominations" augurs a flexibility and adaptability of viewpoint that promise some measure of progress, and of agreement, even if that agreement be one of rejection rather than of acceptation.

In later reflection over the proceedings, one realizes that the positions expounded include possibilities of agreement that were imperceptible at the time of expression. And one can safely state that the old hard-and-fast, mutually exclusive type of distinction between entities is in bad favor with the majority of the participants; and while not all would unite in anathematizing it, no one would obstinately defend it or attach an overweening importance to it. There also was a marked tendency to agree in the exclusion of epistemological considerations from the topic of discussion: this is a fact which in itself affords encouragement, since some degree of isolation of the question is thereby secured.

On the other hand, one can hardly avoid concluding that first impressions were accompanied by an exaggeration of the novelty of idea, of the freedom from the surveillance of the past, and of the approximation toward precision in the defining of issues. Not a small part of what seemed novel turns out to have been familiar notions in a new garb—as examples of the peculiar trick practised by old doctrines of getting intimately involved in the new doctrines which are bravely asserting their independence of the traditional, thus turning up in disguise like an unwelcome guest at a masquerade. In borrowing the terminology of the sciences, and, in particular, of the biological sciences, the contents of our terms sometimes become a not very judicious mixture of relevant and irrelevant philosophical and scientific elements. The recasting of philosophical problems in the language of science is not a solution of the problem. The utilization of the sciences is wholly praiseworthy, of course; but the confusion of reformulations and solutions is another matter. The proceedings seem to disclose instances of such confusion.

An attempt to summarize the points of agreement and disagreement in a discussion involving so many minds, and to characterize the temper of the meeting, is probably a presumptuous proceeding. It is possible that any endeavor to appraise the value of the meeting depends so largely upon one's personal equation that the task had better not be attempted. But these observations, thanks to their generality, may not be wholly amiss or offensive. At any rate, however ungracious the attempt to estimate results, it can hardly be inappropriate to indicate the vigor of interest and the cooperative spirit evinced by the members of the association, and to present some scanty recognition of the services of the executive committee.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Critical Realism: A Study of the Nature and Conditions of Knowledge. Roy Wood Sellars. Chicago: Rand, McNally & Company. 1916. Pp. x + 283.

We are indebted to Professor Sellars for a keenly-argued and comprehensive treatment of epistemological problems. The merits of his book will, I venture to predict, meet with appreciative recognition from students of philosophy wherever it is read. The reader is impressed by the author's extensive acquaintance with the literature of the subject and by his critical acumen; if the constructive portion of the works fails of completeness it is only fair to assume that this will be made good, in accordance with the plan of the author, in subsequent volumes. The statement in the preface that the views developed in the book "are the summary of many years of teaching and of hard and pretty constant thinking" (while perhaps unnecessary) is not difficult of belief, and the theory of knowledge to which this protracted reflection has led is worthy of thoughtful consideration.

One notable merit of the book is its historic approach to the problem. The author refers to the agreement of Locke and Berkeley that if there is to be knowledge of the physical world it must be of the nature of direct or indirect apprehension. Either the physical world itself or a substitute copy must be present to the understanding when we think. But while he rejects the copy theory it is refreshing to find that the author does not regard the shortcomings of the copy theory as sufficient ground for returning to immediate realism. Rather the opposite: he holds that the absolute untenability of immediate realism leads inevitably to the copy theory, and that the final solution of the problem requires us to push forward that movement of critical reflection of which it is the first step.

Chapter I. is given to a discussion of the immediate or "natural" realism which holds that the physical thing itself is present to consciousness. Reflection upon experience soon discloses that the individual perceives only the appearances of the thing and not the thing itself. Science confirms this conclusion; it "unconsciously swings ever more completely away from the assumption that physical things are open to our inspection or that substitute copies are open to our inspection" (p. vi). Realism dominates in science, but idealistic motives increase. The situation is relieved by a temporary compromise: the percept is admitted to be mental, but is referred to a physical thing, its cause. The problem is still insistent and its solution requires the full development of the idealistic factor in experience. The facts which count in favor of idealism are presented in

Chapter III., "The Advance of the Personal," and the following four chapters are devoted to questions arising in connection with the idealistic reconstruction of experience. The conditions of perception are seen to be different with every individual and concepts to be developed under the influence of individual interests and purposes. Idealism is successful at least in proving that realism, if it is to be saved, must abandon the view that the physical object is immediately present to perception. Idealism shows that the dualism ordinarily recognized between mental and non-mental in perception is one within the unity of the mental as a whole; hence knowledge can not be a direct apprehension by the mind of the non-mental.

In Chapters VII. and VIII. the author passes from a criticism of idealism to a statement of his own view, that of mediate or critical realism. The error involved in idealism turns out to be the assumption that knowledge demands the presence of what is known. But because things which common sense assumes are present to the mind and at the same time non-mental prove to be mental, it in nowise follows that objects known and not present to the mind are likewise mental. "My thesis is then that idealism and realism have had essentially the same view of knowledge and that the large measure of sterility which has accompanied philosophical controversy is due to this constant assumption that knowledge always involves the presence of the existent known in the field of experience. Philosophy limited itself to a controversial study of the subject-object duality and did not lift its eyes to the triad consisting of subject, idea-object (in science analyzable into propositions) and physical existent. It is to this triad that critical realism calls attention" (Preface, vii). "The thing is absent while the idea is present. This idea may consist of propositions which are referred to the thing" (p. 150). Thus physical things are causally connected with percepts and help to control their development, but are not perceived. "What is perceived does not cause its own perception. But we are able to conceive this *absence-in-presence* of the physical thing by means of the distinction between the thing and the thought of it which we already possess. The presence-in-absence of thought makes thinkable the absence-in-presence of perception" (p. 129).

Very skilfully the author formulates his own view in connection with the historical development of epistemological theory; he is also remarkably successful in the effort which every thinker who chooses this approach must make, to prove that his own theory is the natural goal of the historical development, reconciling opposing views and including the truth to which each in its one-sided way does justice. But this is only the first part of his task. The second and more important is to work out with thoroughness his own view, demonstrating in some

detail that it solves the specific problems of the field. In this he has made only a beginning. The reader is particularly desirous of learning how the systematized concepts through which the subjectivity of perception is overcome and the thinker is made acquainted with independently existing reality, themselves gain objectivity. Some interesting suggestions are made in Chapter II. Individuals are not in a position to ascertain, we are told, how divergent their thing-experiences are, when these are derived from perception. Hence they are compelled to resort to tests of grouping and of arrangment in series. "Such tests rest upon, and are bound up with, movement, for which passive content is unimportant. The perception of movement is a perception of a relation or a successive series of relations. Hence we seek correspondence and not similarity. In other words, order dominates over passive quality" (p. 62). These statements are promising, and it is a pity that the author does not continue his investigations along this line. The only other suggestions as to the criteria of truth and objectivity are given in the last chapter on "Truth and Knowledge." Correspondence is admitted to be a genuine test, but limited to immediate experience. "At the level of mediate realism it is realized that such a comparison between physical existents and propositions which are supposed to contain knowledge is impossible. The test is immanent and concerns the harmony between data and propositions based on them according to inductive and deductive methods" (p. 282). Coherence, we are elsewhere told, is one of the criteria of truth, but not its universal sign. How then does reality exercise control over the propositions which claim to give knowledge of it? Is there a preestablished harmony between the system of ideas and the order of existence?

Instead of a further exposition of mediate realism we are given an attempted solution of the mind-body problem in a long chapter entitled "Is Consciousness Alien to the Physical?" Evidently the author attaches considerable importance to the view here set forth; he remarks in his preface: "I feel certain that the reader will find many parts of the chapter extremely interesting" (p. vii). (Of course, it is a matter of taste, but such a statement seems to me out of place in the preface to a scientific treatise. It reminds one too much of the "puffs" which magazine editors sometimes give to the contributions they publish.) The theory is in brief that consciousness is a "functional variant of the cortex" and "its unity is that of the integrative activity of the brain which it helps direct." Such statements (and this formula is repeated with variations of language) mean little or nothing without a very clear and thoroughgoing explanation. The statement that consciousness is a functional variant of the cortex is capable of radically mechanistic interpretation. Yet

evidently the author does not mean it to be thus understood, for he rgards it as inconsistent with evolution to hold that nature is a dead-level system and says there is no adequate reason to deny that the physical world rises to the level of purposive activity. But if purpose enters the natural world as a directing agency it must bring with it a type of relation different from, and in a sense contrary to, the externality of mere mechanism. The author recognizes none such, however; he says there is no valid reason to deny that consciousness is an extended manifold and proposes as a name for his theory "Neo-Materialism." Chapter IX. is the least valuable and interesting part of an excellent book.

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The Problem of Personality. ERNEST NORTHFIELD MERRINGTON. London: Macmillan and Company, Limited. 1916. Pp. 220.

An attempt to show that personality must be accepted as the initial datum from which we may proceed to a statement of the fundamental truths of philosophy and theology forms the subject-matter of this book. The first part of the work, which is devoted to an exposition and criticism of recent British and American writers in whose theories the concept of the self has occupied an important place, serves as the background with reference to which the constructive part of the treatment is concerned.

We pass immediately to the crucial point of the argument. The concept of experience has been dangerously vague. A scrutiny of this concept discloses the fact that the subject-object is the primary datum involved in all experience. The author lightly dismisses the difficulty in the position that if the subject-object be the initial assumption then the same reality must be ascribed to the object as to the subject. The subject, it is asserted, is the permanent center of reference for a shifting circumference of objects. Moreover, the subject is not limited in experience to cognition; the self which feels is as much the subject in experience as the knower. Self, person, consciousness, and kindred concepts are discovered to be various phases of the subject—"The one for whom any set of experiences is." By way of comment on this position we can only reiterate that argument which claims the advantage for experience or immediacy as the initial datum in philosophical theory. Here experience is used advisedly to denote that vague, indefinite, unanalyzed context upon which a later reflection operates in making the distinction of subject and object. The self as subject is held to be coexistential with the object, both being analytically evolved from an original complex.

With the reality of the self established the last chapters are occupied with the deduction of a metaphysic of existence, a metaphysic of values, and a metaphysic of reality. The reality of an absolute self is found to be implied in the reality of the self. This absolute self as a personality is derived from the nature of the subject as experiencing meaning or values. Finally, the worlds of "existence and of value upon which in distinction from each other I have laid so much stress, coalesce in the complete expression of divine purpose and of absolute value."

SAVILLA ALICE ELKUS.

SMITH COLLEGE.

Natural Rights: A Criticism of Some Political and Ethical Conceptions. DAVID G. RITCHIE. Third edition. London: George Allen and Unwin. 1916. Pp. 300.

This book, first published in 1894 and now appearing without revision, shows inevitably the traces of controversies for the most part forgotten. On the other hand, not only are the general principles discussed of perennial interest, but in several instances particular problems are dealt with which are of present significance. Such, for example, is the consideration of the propriety of limiting the hours of work of railway employees, and of the extent to which liberty should be interfered with in the prevention of strikes.

The theoretical argument of the book is as follows: An appeal is made to natural rights when no legal basis can be found for the attainment of certain desired ends, or, more particularly, for the relief of what is felt to be oppression. The term "natural rights" is ambiguous. Of the various senses in which it has been used, the only legitimate one for political purposes is that of "the more fundamental rights which would be guaranteed by a society which was as it *ought* to be." The determination of the duty of society in this matter is based upon considerations of utility alone, and is relative to given circumstances. The greater part of the book is occupied with a discussion of particular "natural" rights, and is an illuminating commentary upon the difficulties of reconciling actual American practise (based upon utility) with American principles (based upon abstract and absolute rights).

HARRIETT BRADLEY.

NEW YORK CITY.

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, March, 1916. *Le rêve dans la littérature moderne* (pp. 209–274): Y. DELAGE. – The writer considers the use made of dreams in the writings of many nineteenth-century

authors, and concludes by indicating "that which is forbidden, that which is permissible, and that which one should demand" in connection with such use of dreams. *La crédulité primitive et ses survivances* (pp. 257–287): TH. RIBOT. – Distinguishes between those whose credulity is permanent and those with whom it is transient or partial; the former are characterized by inaptitude for logical thinking, repugnance to hesitation and doubt, and by finding repose in immediate acceptance and belief. *Une forme de l'automatisme social: la convention* (pp. 288–297): MARC DUFAUX. – Convention signifies a "sentiment, idea, a manner of thinking, speaking, or acting, which conforms or tends to conform to a type or ready-made representation, in accordance with which the collective consciousness demands that the ideas, sentiments, and acts of every one be modelled." Conventions are formed by crystallization of social experience because of a need for simple and universal guiding formulas. *Notes et discussions. Analyses et comptes rendus.* Betrand Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World:* M. SOLOVINE. *Varia. Revue des périodiques.*

Conklin, Edwin Grant. Heredity and Environment. Second edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1917. Pp. 288. $2.10.

Morgan, Thomas Hunt. A Critique of the Theory of Evolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Pp. 208. $1.50.

Robie, W. F. Rational Sex Ethics. Boston: Richard G. Badger. 1917. $3.50.

Rockefeller, John D., Jr. The Personal Relation in Industry. New York. 1917. Pp. 43.

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NOTES AND NEWS

A MEETING of the Aristotelian Society was held in London on Monday, January 22, Dr. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the chair. Mr. C. E. M. Joad read a paper on "Monism in the Light of Recent Developments in Philosophy." A monistic theory, he maintained, confuses two quite distinct propositions. A thing is what it is, not only because it has a place in the universe and because of its relations to other things, but also because those relations are not the thing. To assert that a thing is its relations involves a second and quite different proposition. A thing, indeed, presupposes reality and its connections with reality, just as our apprehension of a truth pre-

supposes reality. But when we assert that a thing is what it is because of its connections with reality, we do not mean that the thing is its connections. They condition it, but it is separate from them. The other main monistic argument is to the effect that the ultimate real being one and indivisible, all analysis by means of which we arrive at a world composed of things and relations is a false abstraction of thought, which leads us away from reality. It is true that a whole, although created by its parts, is more than their sum. A whole, as opposed to an aggregate, is a unity,—a new entity which has come into being through their synthesis. But such a whole clearly has parts which it can not be a fiction to distinguish from one another. The fact that analysis of a whole into parts destroys the whole does not mean that it also destroys the parts, or that the parts are not really its parts, or that they can not exist as distinguished from one another.

DR. SMITH ELY JELLIFFE, of New York City, has been appointed editor of the *New York Medical Journal* to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Dr. Claude L. Wheeler. Dr. Jelliffe was editor of the *Medical News* before that periodical was discontinued, and is now managing editor of the *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease.*

DR. GREGORY D. WALCOTT, professor of philosophy and psychology in Hamline University, has been given a year's leave of absence to teach psychology and logic in the government college of Tsing Hua, China. He expects to sail from San Francisco about the first of July.

PROFESSOR H. S. JENNINGS, of the Johns Hopkins University, is delivering a series of four Westbrook lectures on "Heredity and Evolution" at the Wagner Institute, Philadelphia.

MR. ALFRED E. REJALL, formerly instructor in psychology in the New York State Teachers College at Albany, has been appointed instructor in education at Boston University.

PROFESSOR E. A. KILPATRICK, of the Fitchburg, Massachusetts, State Normal School, is exchange professor this year at the Bellingham State Normal College, Washington.

DR. JOSEPH K. HART, formerly professor of education in the University of Washington, has been appointed professor of education at Reed College, Portland, Oregon.

DR. FABIAN FRANKLIN, associate editor of the New York *Evening Post,* has resigned. Dr. Franklin was formerly professor of mathematics in the Johns Hopkins University.

THE Gifford lectures at Glasgow University are this year being given by Professor Samuel Alexander, of Manchester University, on "Space, Time, and Deity."